must be clearly defined and tests require appropriate data. More specifically, two conditions must be satisfied. First, preferences and parties must be synthesized into testable theories. This has proven problematic as theorists, most notably Krehbiel (1996 Krehbiel ( , 1998 ; see also Brady & Volden, 1998) , have rejected the relevance of parties, and empirical party scholars have not theoretically linked their work to capture the potentially complicated and dynamic relationship between parties and preferences (e.g., Binder, 2003) . Second, data must be of sufficient quality and quantity to produce confidence in empirical results. Although earlier work by Chiou and Rothenberg (2003) may meet the first criterion, previous analyses may be criticized as not satisfying the second, particularly by estimating models using data over a brief historical era.
Nor does collecting data during a longer period simply solve this problem, as temporal changes in institutional rules complicate theoretical testing. Most important for gridlock models, the cloture requirement created by Rule 22's 1917 passage in the U.S. Senate poses a challenge. Specifically, filibuster pivots are a key component for measuring equilibrium gridlock intervals (EGIs)-which are the set of status quo policies at the beginning of a Congress that, in equilibrium, are unchanged when that Congress concludes-in pivotal politics theories and their partisan extensions.
With this in mind, we generalize Chiou and Rothenberg's (2003) gridlock models by accounting for changes in the filibuster rule and generate EGIs capturing the impacts of preferences and parties that are amenable to historical empirical testing. We then test these models using data extending back to the late 19th century to allow us to draw inferences confidently about what role parties and their leaders play, if any, relative to actor preferences for the EGIs realized and the legislative choices made. Our findings not only provide a key piece of evidence in distinguishing between whether preference-based approaches or those integrating parties best capture legislative decision making but also allow us to distinguish which partisan features appear to matter. In addition, our research provides insight into the importance of incorporating the filibuster rule for estimating the gridlock interval and the impact of the adoption of Rule 22.
Thinking About the Pre-1917 Filibuster Rule
Rule 22, see Bawn & Koger, 2003; Binder & Smith, 1997; Koger, 2002; Mayhew, 2003; . Although there was a formal rule pre-Rule 22-each member having the right to filibuster and unanimity required for proceeding-assuming unanimity has little plausibility and would not produce a model with meaningful predictive capacity.
Indeed, by all accounts, the founding fathers considered the Senate a majoritarian institution that would be slowed by member deliberation rather than rules (Binder & Smith, 1997) . Although this presumption appeared to break down somewhat in the late 19th century, there is reason to believe that Rule 22 de facto expanded or ratified the supermajority required for legislative passage.
Besides historical observation, there are several reasons why assuming unanimity is unreasonable. For one thing, late 19th century Senate precedents mitigated the effectiveness of dilatory motions (Burdette, 1940) . For another, indefinite filibustering by any member or group of members is very costly (e.g., Beth & Bach, 2003; . Also, because legislators are interacting so many times on different legislation, they may be able to generate a norm that establishes a de facto filibuster rule well below 100%; indeed, the breakdown of such a tacit agreement might have necessitated the formalization embodied in Rule 22. 1 Furthermore, empirical analysis suggests that the filibuster pivot was no more than two thirds in earlier years. For example, Wawro and Schickler (2003) maintain that the empirical evidence indicates the 1917 changes induced larger supermajorities.
2 Although existing evidence is not definitive given the possibility of other factors working and the need for a more precise theory of coalition size and filibuster pivots, it is consistent with the cut point being upper bounded at two thirds. 3 Given the near consensus that the filibuster requirement was, in general, either strengthened or maintained in 1917, we assume that Rule 22 either ratified a shaky status quo or somewhat raised the filibuster requirement. As this leaves no magical formula for setting the filibuster pivot, we principally distinguish among: (a) pure majoritarianism, which almost certainly did not characterize the situation pre-Rule 22; (b) modest supermajority-as an intuitive range to settle on if Rule 22 strengthened the filibuster rule, a variety of points between pure majoritarianism and 67%; and (c) post-1917 supermajority (67%), capturing the possibility that Rule 22 formalized the status quo. However, for generality and to capture what a narrow reading of the Senate rules would produce, we also refer to findings where the filibuster is assumed to be beyond 67%.
We now review and generalize Chiou and Rothenberg's (2003) four competing models, sketching key characteristics and determinants of the EGIs for each and indicating how the lack of a pre-1917 filibuster rule affects expectations by focusing on how varying the cloture requirement changes the gridlock interval. Our discussion is nontechnical and highlights how different EGIs may be, and are, produced (not all possible EGI types are realized in our data).
All four models have common assumptions-unidimensional policy space (e.g., liberalism-conservatism), single-peaked preferences, bicameralism, and the existence of left and right filibuster pivots-but differ in how parties are conceptualized. 4 In one model parties have no role, in another parties function as agenda-setters, in a third they also control their members, and in a fourth presidents also serve as the leader for their party's members.
Basic Model (Preferences With No Party Role)
This model is similar to Krehbiel's (1998) pivotal politics model except that it includes a second legislative chamber and a second filibuster pivot closer to the president. There are five players-the House and Senate median voters and override pivots, the liberal and conservative filibuster pivots in the Senate, and the president-and a game sequence: (a) the Senate median proposes a bill; (b) each filibuster pivot chooses whether to filibuster (maintaining the status quo) or to let the game proceed to the next stage; (c) the House median rejects the bill (again maintaining the status quo) or accepts it to allow the game's continuation; (d) the president signs or vetoes the bill; (e) given a veto, the chamber override pivots decide either sustain or override, with the status quo only changing if both override.
When this game is solved with different cloture requirements, we find that increasing cloture requirements positively affect the estimated EGI's size, with the extent of this effect depending on preference distributions in each chamber and the president's ideal points. 5 To illustrate, consider Figure 1 , which shows the case where the president is more conservative than the override veto pivots and cloture requirements are gradually increased from 50% to 90% (note that more extreme cloture rules produce more extreme filibuster pivot locations). As the cloture requirement is made more stringent, the EGI (the bold portion of each line) eventually becomes greater, but not in linear fashion. An increase from a 50% to 55% rule has no effect, as the left and right filibuster pivots are more moderate than are the House median and overriding pivots, respectively. When the cloture requirement becomes sufficiently severe-60% and then 70%-for the left filibuster pivot to be more extreme than the House median, the EGI expands on the lower bound. Even more dramatic EGI expansion occurs when the cloture rule is assumed to be 80% or 90%, as the right filibuster pivot is now more extreme than are both the House and Senate override pivots. Should the president be more moderate than the overriding pivots, the same pattern 
arises, except that the cut point is the president's ideal point rather than the more extreme overriding pivot's. Figure 2 , using Poole's (1998) common space scores to estimate preferences, shows the estimated EGIs for the basic model for the 47th to 106th Congresses, with alternative cloture assumptions for the pre-1917 period.
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Several features deserve note. First, regardless of the pre-1917 cloture rule assumption, the estimated EGIs largely rise and fall in tandem. These intervals begin at a very high level, reflecting how preference polarization produced very extreme filibuster pivots in the late 19th century, which generally decline up to the Great Depression, at which point they, not surprisingly, become very low and then subsequently rise but never return to the heights of our sample's early period. Second, as theory dictates, overall the pre-1917 estimated EGIs increase with stricter cloture assumptions, and this effect is nonlinear. Indeed, following up on this last point, assuming a bare majority cloture requirement results in more temporal fluctuation of the estimated EGI relative to other rules. Most notably, when a bare majority rule is assumed, the EGI jumps a great deal when, despite no assumption of any party influence and a focus only on preferences, divided government arises. For example, although the EGI for the 50% rule is less than .1 in the 53rd Congress, as the preferences of the president (Cleveland) and the chamber median were closely aligned, it jumps beyond .6 in the 54th Congress when House Republicans gained 120 seats and the lower chamber median shifted dramatically away from the chief executive. This fluctuation in EGIs created by changing membership is far greater than that realized for more stringent assumptions about cloture. By contrast, in periods such as that from the 56th to 60th Congress, where the legislative medians and the president had similar preferences throughout, there is no more fluctuation when the 50% rule is compared to alternatives; indeed, for this era the EGI's width is affected little by raising cloture from 50% to 59%, as the senators at these two points have quite similar preferences (this is not the case if a 67% rule is assumed).
Alternatively, assuming that Rule 22 codified the status quo produces a pattern where the EGI, while dropping slowly over time, never falls to a very low level such as that found for less restrictive cloture rules and is still relatively high before Franklin Roosevelt assumed office. The reason for such discrepancies is that the filibuster pivots now play an important role in calculating the EGI, suggesting greater potential gridlock. Only with Roosevelt's first (73rd) Congress did the EGI decrease substantially, with the lowest EGI length associated with the 74th Congress (the distance between the House override pivot and the right filibuster pivot being less than .2). EGI size somewhat increased beginning with World War II, but, interestingly, the postwar EGI never reached pre-FDR levels, although it has recently come close as, with increasing polarization, the right filibuster has become more extreme.
Again, consistent with the impact of changing assumptions about cloture requirements being nonlinear, the 59% cloture rule for the pre-1917 period sometimes mimics the 50% rule and sometimes the 67% alternative, depending on which preference distributions are realized. In the early years of our sample, the EGI is a bit lower but mirrors the 67% rule as the locations of the 59th and 67th percentile filibuster pivots differ relatively little; for reasons already discussed (the correspondence in preferences between Senators who would determine cloture), from the 56th to 60th Congress there is little difference with the 50% rule; and in the subsequent period, there is little difference with the 67% rule for reasons analogous to those found in the earliest years of our sample.
Party as Agenda Setter
In this model, the Senate majority party median (or, in practice, the party leaders or committee chairs they select), rather than the chamber median, proposes under a closed rule. The basic model's game sequence is modified so that in Stage 3 the House majority party median and chamber medians sequentially choose whether or not to veto (retaining the status quo), and the game proceeds to Stage 4 only if they all decide not to veto. Preferences still determine member floor votes and, as the medians must endorse policy shifts in equilibrium, chamber medians are still decisive for final passage.
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Assuming that parties play an agenda-setting role produces gridlock intervals that are as large as or larger than for the basic model. EGIs will be larger when the difference between the majority party medians and the filibuster or override pivot is relatively large. To see this, consider the situation depicted in Figure 1 , where the cloture rule is 60%. Here, the EGI for the agenda-setting model is the same as the basic model when the Senate and House majority medians are between the left filibuster (f L ) and the House override pivot (V H ). When this is not the case, the EGI will expand, and one or both of the EGI boundaries will be majority party medians. Also, the effect of cloture requirements on the EGI size in this model is analogous to that in the previous model, except that now the cut point is majority party medians, assuming that they are more extreme than override pivots.
Yet as Figure 3 shows, empirically the observed EGI pattern mimics the preference based model (the correlation is .94). The only slight divergence between the two is that the EGI pre-and post-Franklin Roosevelt is larger than in the basic model, and the EGI of postreform Congresses in the 1970s is not relatively small (because party medians, which now play a role in determining EGIs, became more extreme).
Party Unity
In this model, the parties within each chamber solve their coordination problems by listening to the median (this seemingly extreme assumption is consistent with theoretical and empirical findings for various circumstances). The revised game sequence is: (a) analogous to the Senate chamber median in the basic model, the Senate majority party median proposes a bill; (b) the Senate minority party median chooses whether to filibuster and continue the status quo or to let the game proceed to the next stage; (c) the House majority party median chooses whether to reject the bill, maintaining the status quo and ending the game, or to accept the bill and continue the game; (d) the president decides whether to sign and induce policy change or to veto; (e) given a veto, the majority and minority parties in both chambers decide whether to sustain the veto and maintain the status quo or override, with a new policy prevailing when both chambers override.
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Bringing in these party effects produces EGI patterns that are considerably more nuanced than observed in a world of weak parties. Specifically, EGI size may be very large or small depending on preferences and the role that party plays under divided and unified government (Figure 4 ). When Congress is divided (as in the 48th-50th, 52nd, 62nd, 65th, and 97th-99th Congresses), the EGI is typically large, as it is at least as great as the difference between the two majority medians (of opposite parties) in the chambers. When Congress is unified, party unity may produce any of three EGI types:
Chiou, Rothenberg / Legislative Productivity 713 1. When there are very large majority parties or a Senate majority large enough to invoke cloture and, among other things, a president more extreme than the medians of his party which is in the majority, a generally small EGI is between the majority medians in both chambers. This occurs sporadically in our sample (60th, 74th-77th, 87th-90th, and 95th Congresses, if we assume a 67th percentage filibuster rule pre-Rule 22, with some additional pre-1917 Congresses added if lower pre-Rule 22 filibuster rules are assumed). 2. Given a very moderate president and majority party size larger than the cloture requirement, another generally small EGI (but slightly larger than the first EGI type) is between the president and the majority medians. This is rarely observed (assuming a 67th percentage rule pre-Rule 22, only the 60th and 86th Congresses apply; with a lower pre-1917 filibuster rule, such as 59%, the 56th-59th and 61st Congresses are added). 3. If either the Senate majority party is too small to invoke cloture or the president is more extreme than his parties-which control more than one third and less than half of Senate seats-a typically much larger EGI distribution.
between one of the majority medians and one of the minority medians is realized. Such a gridlock interval characterizes the remaining Congresses where control of each chamber lies in the same party's hands.
As for varying the cloture requirement, given a divided Congress or a divided government with a unified Congress and extreme presidents whose parties control at least one third of the seats in at least one chamber, the EGI remains quite wide under different filibuster rules. However, in other cases (e.g., unified government or divided government with a unified Congress and moderate presidents), altering cloture has a more varied and complicated effect. Essentially, the EGI is small and unchanged when the requirement is lower than the Senate majority size; as the cloture requirement increases and exceeds the Senate majority size, the EGI discontinuously and dramatically expands but then remains the same.
A numerical example illustrates the underlying processes determining these effects for unified and divided government (see Figure 5 ). Suppose that the Senate majority median's ideal point is .3, the House majority median's is .2, the Senate minority median is -.2, and the House minority median is -.3. Also, suppose that the Senate and House majorities control 57% and 60% of seats. When the president's ideal point is .4 (i.e., the chief executive is more extreme than the Senate majority median but is from the same party), the EGI is .1 when anywhere from 50% to 56% of senators are needed to end debate but rises to .5 when more than 56% are required and stays at that level for any more restrictive cloture rule, including unanimity. Moderating the president's ideal point results in the same nonlinear relationship between EGIs and filibuster rules, but the differences between the low and high EGIs vary. For instance, as the dotted line in Figure 5 indicates, the EGI jumps from .2 to .5 at 57% if the president's ideal point is .1. But, as the filibuster rule is irrelevant with divided government for extreme presidents whose parties control more than one third of seats in at least one chamber, if the president's ideal point is -.25, the EGI remains at .55 regardless of the cloture rule. leadership is assumed. The first, very narrow, EGI is either between the House and Senate majority medians or an empty set but can only occur either when the party other than the president's has sufficiently large House and Senate majorities to override the chief executive's presidential veto or when government is unified and the Senate majority is big enough to invoke cloture. As illustrated in Figure 6 , this EGI is realized both before 1917 and in the 74th to 77th, 87th to 90th, and 95th Congresses. The second EGI is typically large, as it is the interval between the president and his opposing party median(s) and occurs (a) when government is divided with a united Congress whose majority parties have insufficient seats for a successful override; (b) when there is a divided Congress; or (c) when there is unified government but a small enough Senate majority that cloture is not feasible.
Changing the filibuster requirement has a largely analogous impact to that for the party unity model and thus requires little detailing. Size of majority parties and the president's preferences are key and effects of varying cloture rules are more complicated than for the first two models. Note: P = Presidential ideal point. Assume ideal point for Senate majority median = .3 (minority = -.2), ideal point for House majority median = .2 (minority = -.3). Senate majority party controls 57% of seats; House majority party controls 60% of seats.
distribution.
Congresses in our analysis, the EGI for party unity is about 20% lower than for the presidential leadership model because presidential preferences would make party members less likely to assent to change. Also, there are a number of instances when varying the assumption about the pre-1917 cloture level has even more dramatic effects than for the party unity model. Specifically, given presidential leadership, there are Congresses where the estimated EGI width is zero because the cloture requirement is lower than the Senate majority size and the president is assumed to be able to resolve the gridlock caused by his own party members in both chambers. Finally, another difference between the presidential model and the other three theories is that the EGI during pre-cloture reform is not estimated to be the historical high point for our sample. The EGI is highest during Harding's administration (67th-68th Congress), Roosevelt's first term (73rd Congress), Truman's administration (80th-82nd Congresses), Reagan's years (97th-100th Congresses), and (the first) Bush's administration (101st-102nd Congresses). 
Testing the Theories
Having overviewed the filibuster's historical role and theoretically synthesized the effects of preferences and institutions, we now assess which model works best empirically. We contrast competing theoretical hypotheses, outline specification and measurement, and discuss our findings.
Hypotheses
Our core hypothesis is that the more appropriate theory should explain legislative productivity better. Specifically, assuming identical and uniform distribution of status quo policies in each period, we can compare EGI widths at the same or different points in time.
10 Larger widths should produce less legislative productivity. Absolute EGI values and their change should affect legislative gridlock or productivity and their change, respectively. Hence, we can compare which model better explains what we observe in the real world.
Model Specification and Measurement
Analysis requires measuring political gridlock as a dependent variable, the EGIs and control variables as independent variables, and an appropriate estimation strategy. (2003) discuss, operationalizing political gridlock is difficult as a measure should, ideally, incorporate components of legislative demand and supply, as low production may indicate high gridlock or a limited political agenda.
Dependent variables. As Chiou and Rothenberg
11 However, legislative demand is unobservable and, as such, no existing measure is perfect; nor, in contrast to Binder's measure for the contemporary period, is there an historical measure that at least allows demand to vary rather than implicitly assuming that it is constant. To date, there are essentially two available historical measures. One is Petersen's (2001) for 1881 to 1946 that directly attempts to extend Mayhew's (1991) contemporary measure of significant bills. 12 The second is Young and Heitshusen's (2002) and covers approximately the same period (1874-1946) but employs the U.S. Code to develop a set of landmark bills. Hence, we create two related, dependent variables, Petersen-Mayhew and YH-Mayhew, combining each of these measures with Mayhew's.
Independent variables.
To measure the EGIs that we presented earlier, we employ Poole's (1998) common space coordinates. By making the (admittedly strong) assumption that legislators serving in both chambers of Congress behave in roughly the same manner, this method allows the estimation of scores that, unlike NOMINATE, are comparable across chambers and over time.
14 For the first ideological dimension (which is all that we use in this analysis), the scores correlate with NOMINATE at .95 or better, strongly indicating measurement validity. In addition, with information about presidential requests, we incorporate presidential ideal points into this common space, which is necessary for our hypothesis testing.
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As Figures 2, 3 , 4, and 6 illustrate, the basic and agenda-setting models have much in common, as do the party and presidential leadership models with each other. 16 Furthermore, changing assumptions about the filibuster requirement (between 50% and 67%) pre-1917 is less likely to produce divergent EGIs for the former two models than the latter two.
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In addition, we include three control variables. First, as foreshadowed, we specify a dummy variable, postwar, as 1 for the 80th to 105th Congresses and 0 otherwise to capture any systematic differences between Mayhew's means of compiling landmark bills and that of either Petersen or Young and Heitshusen.
18 Second, following Chiou and Rothenberg (2003), we include budget, the percentage of the budget relative to federal outlays that is in surplus or deficit, to capture the budgetary situation. It is typically assumed that government will engage in more important new initiatives when the budget is in surplus.
19 Finally, we include start of term, coded 1 for the first half of a presidential term and 0 for the second, to account for any advantages that the president holds early in his term compared to later that might not be directly captured by the EGIs (e.g., the president may be better to exploit a reputation advantage to induce congressional concessions earlier in his term; McCarty, 1997).
Given our event count, time series data, we need to account for potential autocorrelation and possible underestimation of actual dispersion (i.e., overdispersion). As such, we employ a log-linear model using iterative weighted least squares (WLS) developed by Katsouyanni et al. (1996) and Schwartz et al. (1996) , as it flexibly deals with both issues. This involves initially estimating a Poisson regression model to obtain parameter starting values and then incorporating the residuals into the model's subsequent iteration; the estimated variance-covariance matrix allows adjustment for autocorrelation and overdispersion. 20 In addition, DickeyFuller tests indicate that, with 99% confidence, our dependent variables are stationary. 
Findings and Discussion
Tables 1 through 4 present WLS estimates for our four models. Note that in the first two tables we present estimates for the 50th, 59th, and 67th percentiles, as the findings for the 54th and 63rd percentiles are very similar, although in the latter two tables we include all five sets of results, as findings vary more, consistent with our theoretical finding that EGIs are more sensitive to changes in the cloture assumption for the party unity and presidential leadership models.
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Simply put, regardless of filibuster pivot choice, models with little partisan role get scant support. Gridlock intervals for the pure preference, basic model are not statistically significant in the predicted direction for either dependent variable for all alternative locations. Results are comparable for the agenda-setting model with the nuance that EGIs are marginally significant in one instance (using the Young-Mayhew dependent variable with a 67th percentile filibuster pivot). Otherwise, for either model, only if filibuster assumptions are set at an unreasonably high level based on theoretical logic and the historical record does the EGI coefficient reach statistical significance; for the Petersen-Mayhew data, the rule would have to exceed 75% and 76% in the basic and agenda-setting models, although for the YH-Mayhew data it would need to be greater than 90% and 82%. 22 An additional regularity for both models is that fit improves somewhat as we move the filibuster percentile higher. Postwar is always positive and significant, indicating that Mayhew's data procurement process produced a greater number of important bills, everything else being equal, than does Petersen's or Young and Heitshusen's. Start of term is consistently significant for the Petersen-Mayhew data but not for the YH-Mayhew data (dropping this variable makes no difference for other results). Finally, first-order autocorrelation exists for the YH-Mayhew data, and there is marginal evidence of autocorrelation for Petersen-Mayhew data. Joint F tests for the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the first two orders of residual lags are simultaneously zero lead to rejecting the null hypothesis in both instances.
By contrast, integrating party unity matters, but there is no support for incorporating presidential leadership. Specifically, there is evidence that gridlock interval matters for party unity, with support being generally stronger as the filibuster pivot is increased to 67% (furthermore, as our theoretical discussion implies, these results hold for seemingly unreasonable assumptions about the filibuster location because the EGI in the party unity model remains unchanged for filibuster rules from 68% to unanimity, no matter where the filibuster pivots locate). 23 In the same vein, although the fit is better relative to the preference and agenda-setting models, like those results the fit for the party unity model improves when the filibuster location is assumed to be higher. Furthermore, the effects of changes in the EGI are substantively strong. For example, if we take our results for the party unity model (assuming a 67th percentile pivot prior to 1917) and assume that the EGI decreases by .868 (the difference between the minimum and maximum calculated in our sample), the average number of predicted significant bills per Congress increases by roughly 5 bills for the PetersenMayhew and the YH-Mayhew samples.
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Two empirical findings support the inference that a model assuming party unity and a pre-1917 filibuster rule of 67% works best for explaining legislative productivity.
25 First, the fit is the best relative to alternative filibuster rules and models (including filibuster rules exceeding 67%). Second, unlike all our other estimates, there is no autocorrelation, suggesting that key temporal elements are being captured as part of the specification.
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Findings for the presidential leadership model are weaker. Results for the EGI mirror those for the party unity model but are only significant when a 67th percentile filibuster is assumed for the YH-Mayhew data and the fit of this model is consistently slightly worse than for the party unity model (and, like the party unity model, the same inferences would be made if the filibuster rule was increased up to unanimity). Thus, interestingly, although with a small, historically limited data set the original Chiou and Rothenberg (2003) analysis could not distinguish whether the party unity or presidential leadership model constituted a better fit, with our temporally richer sample we can say with confidence that the party unity model is superior.
One possibility is that the presidential leadership assumption, that party leaders are completely responsive to the chief executive, is too strict: Perhaps members balance preferences of the median voter or party leaders in the chamber with the president's. As a crude approximation of such bargaining, we recalculate EGIs to be consistent with a world in which party members vote consistently with the midpoint between the president and the median member of the president's party for each chamber and test this model empirically. Although the EGI under this model gains better statistical support than that for the presidential leadership model (results available from authors), it still does worse than the party unity model. Thus, even though eras of great policy activity such as the New Deal and Great Society may be viewed as driven by a Roosevelt or Johnson, it is the nature of the increased party majority in Congress that seems to explain output better than the ability of the president to sanction his party's members.
Put differently, our findings with respect to the statistical significance of the EGIs produced by our different models have four implications:
• No support for pure preference or agenda-setting models exists.
• There is support for party being important.
• There is no evidence for the president playing a key role as part of the partisan process, whether it be as absolute party leader or key partisan influential.
• Results are consistent with Rule 22 formalizing the status quo rather than changing the de facto filibuster rule.
Conclusions
Because understanding legislative productivity requires integrating theoretical and empirical analysis, and because we employ an explicitly historical perspective, our analysis makes a number of contributions and raises a number of issues and directions for future research.
From a theoretical perspective, our analysis shows that the effects of the filibuster are more nuanced and complicated than might be thought. Not only does heightening the filibuster's severity affect EGIs nonlinearly, but this nonlinearity depends on a host of factors and theoretical assumptions (notably, regarding party's importance). Should the filibuster rule be changed, as a number of political pundits and operatives have recently proposed, the impact would vary with time, depending on a number of conditions in ways that are probably not well understood.
Our analysis also shows, reinforcing and clarifying the earlier findings of Chiou and Rothenberg (2003) , that parties should be integrated into the study of legislative productivity. When Rule 22 is viewed as strengthening or formalizing what had previously been accepted practice (and, indeed, even for less reasonable assumptions about the filibuster pre-1917), we can again conclude that party matters because of its ability to discipline members, for example by deciding who gets to sit on key committees or receives other perquisites controlled by the leadership, but we can now say that a strong president is not integral. Furthermore, our evidence is at least consistent with the notion that Rule 22 made the previous de facto filibuster rule de jure.
Jointly, our findings suggest several areas of future research. Regarding theory, we would like to better model and understand filibuster pivot selection within the context of an inherently majoritarian institution such as the U.S. Congress; as our analysis of legislative choices increasingly focuses on models where the filibuster pivot is key, we would want to know obvious institutional obstacles to such bundling, even casual observation indicates that more productive Congresses generate more, and more important, pieces of legislation.
12. Mayhew's (1991) Sweep One data are updated to 2000 (see http://pantheon.yale. edu/~dmayhew/data3.html), but his Sweep Two data are only available through 1987. Chiou and Rothenberg (2003) find that omission of the Sweep Two data is not problematic, and we assume that it is not here.
13. One might worry that combining either data series with Mayhew's (1991) creates measurement problems. Although Petersen (2001) mimics Mayhew's approach, differences in collection methods (e.g., relying more on popular historical treatments than newspapers) may be reflected in the data (a fact Petersen, while finding Mayhew's method valid, acknowledges); Young and Heitshusen's (2002) different approach may produce even greater discrepancies (and, indeed, although we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the variance for the Mayhew and Petersen data are the same, we can when comparing the Mayhew and Young and Heitshusen data). To compensate for any differences in the mean measures of productivity that are artifacts of measurement rather than products of changes in legislative demand, we include statistical controls in our empirical analysis. Another problem is that Young and Heitshusen's measure may involve more serious autocorrelation than might typically be expected as changes to the U.S. Code may be time dependent. Also, although Young and Heitshusen's data extend to 1874, given our independent variables our analysis begins with 1881.
14. The ideological consistency assumption is buttressed by findings that members change their behavior little during their intrachamber careers (Poole, 2003) , and the fact that most House members moving to the Senate come from small states (Snyder, 1992) , where the underlying constituency would not change much, provides additional reason to believe that this assumption is reasonable. Note that common space scores tend to produce results that differ from those found by others, such as Binder (2003; see also Chiou & Rothenberg, 2005) , using temporally incomparable measures. Also note that even should the common space scores be measured with some small error, it is unlikely to affect the estimated EGI (e.g., locating filibuster pivots from a dense preference distribution would yield roughly the same estimate).
15. To date, common space coordinates have been available only from Eisenhower through Clinton, using Congressional Quarterly presidential support roll calls as quasipresidential votes. Thanks to the largess of Keith Poole, presidents were scaled for the longer historical period, using presidential requests of Congress as quasi votes (about 7,000 requests are part of the Database of Historical Congressional Statistics for the 1st to the 101st Congresses; see http://cstlcla.semo.edu/Renka/PRG/PRG_presidencydata.asp). Estimated coordinates fit well, and the ideological placement of members and presidents is intuitive. However, given too few requests, no position is recovered for Presidents Garfield and Hoover. We assume that Garfield occupied the same ideological position as the vice president who succeeded him (Arthur) and that Hoover occupied the same space as the Republican who preceded him (Coolidge).
16. Consistent with our theory, if the filibuster was much greater than 67%, the effect would be far different for the first two models relative to the latter two. If we assume that the right filibuster pivot moves from the 67th to the 100th percentile, the basic and agenda-setting EGIs expand dramatically for 1881 to 1916, whereas the party unity and presidential leadership EGIs remain unchanged (except for the 60th Congress, where Republicans controlled 67.7% of Senate seats). As such, our empirical results for party unity and presidential leadership, assuming a 67% filibuster assumption, apply to stricter filibuster rule assumptions.
17. One complication with the common space coordinates used to estimate the EGIs is that, because of a break point at the 74th Congress for the second ideological dimension, scores are estimated pre-and post-74th Congress (see Poole & Rosenthal, 1997) . However, as estimated, individual legislator and presidential scores shift rightward in a roughly similar magnitude, so our analysis should be unaffected; reflecting this, there is no big jump between the EGIs in the 74th and 75th Congresses. Nor, as we will discuss, does this break appear to affect our model testing.
18. We do not distinguish between periods of direct and appointed senatorial election, given evidence of comparable behavior (Schiller, 2003) and the fact that we measure senators' preferences.
19. Chiou and Rothenberg (2003) also control for public mood, but this series only dates to 1952. However, public mood had virtually no statistical or substantive effect. Substituting alternative measures, such as changing economic conditions and military crises, is similarly unsuccessful. Also, despite directly incorporating partisan effects and the role of divided government, we included a dummy variable for divided government; it too had little effect.
20. This program is available in STATA, using the arpois command. Following Tobias and Campbell (1998) , we initially calculate Pearson residuals to check for autocorrelation. For robustness, we implemented the linear Poisson Autoregressive (PAR (p)) model (Brandt & Williams, 2001; Brandt, Williams, Fordham, & Pollins, 2000 ; program available at http:// www.psci.unt.edu/~brandt/pests/pests.htm), which is a different, although not obviously superior, approach to autocorrelation that does not account for overdispersion. Although many of the results are comparable to weighted least squares, there are some discrepancies that we will note. Also, our results largely mirror Prais-Winston estimation, which has been extensively used for legislative productivity, except that the latter tends to generate somewhat higher standard errors.
21. Concerned about the historical break in common space scores, we reran our models with an interaction term between the EGI and a dummy variable, scored 1 for the 75th to 105th Congresses and 0 otherwise. Not surprisingly, given this variable's high correlation with postwar (correlations of .89, .91, .82, and .75, respectively) , including this interaction has little effect.
22. Estimates for the PAR (p) model are comparable. For the Petersen-Mayhew data, the filibuster rule would have to be greater than 84% and 71% for EGI significance while, for the YH-Mayhew data, no filibuster rule yields significant results for either model. 23. For the Petersen-Mayhew data, the EGI is significant if the filibuster rule is between 52% and 56%, is marginally significant from 57% to 64%, and strongly significant for 65% to 68%. The EGI is significant for the YH-Mayew data as long as the filibuster point exceeds 53%.
24. The average number of bills passed in our sample is about 10 for the Petersen-Mayhew data and about 9 for the YH-Mayhew sample.
25. While asserting that we show that Rule 22 ratified the status quo would be overstepping, as it is possible that the pre-1917 world included a filibuster rule somewhat less than 67% with imperfect party discipline, our results are consistent with this inference.
26. Specifically, a test on the first order of residual lag rejects this possibility. For the YHMayhew data, although examining the residual plot leads us to suspect autocorrelation up to the second order exists to some extent, neither t tests for individual residual lags nor a joint F test of the lags support this inference. For the PAR (p) model, we find some evidence for autocorrelation up to the third order for the YH-Mayhew data and up to first order for the PetersenMayhew data, which may reflect the failure to account for overdispersion in this model and a greater tendency for autocorrelation inherent in the YH data.
